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This paper builds on prior case studies and research from single or a small handful of districts to explore whether principal influence over teacher hiring has changed over time. Conventional wisdom suggests that teacher hiring has become less centralized over time, with authority moving from district human resource departments to principals. However, there is little empirical research to back up anecdotal claims regarding this trend. Further, little is known about district characteristics that are associated with trends and variation in the centralization of teacher hiring.
Using data from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), this study examines trends in the reported influence of principals in hiring new teachers. The SASS has been administered to seven cross-sectional, nationally representative samples of schools between 1987-1988 and 2011-2012 . Each round has included a survey item about principal influence on teacher hiring. Using these data, this paper addresses the following research questions:
RQ1. To what extent is teacher hiring decentralized to principals, and how does principal influence vary across contexts?
RQ2. Has principal influence over teacher hiring increased over time?
RQ3. Do school, district, and contextual factors including urbanicity, charter status, and collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) explain some of the variation in principal reports of influence in teacher hiring?
Evidence on decision-making in teacher hiring A handful of studies provide insight into decision-making in teacher hiring and the extent to which these decisions are made centrally, at the district level, or are decentralized to schools. This research reveals the complex nature of the hiring process, indicating that, at least in the contexts studied, principals have some autonomy in hiring but are also constrained by district staffing practices (Liu et al., 2008) and that the extent to which hiring is centralized varies across districts and states (Liu and Johnson, 2006) . District central offices can play several key roles in teacher hiring including recruiting and screening applicants, processing applications and managing a centralized database of district applicants, extending the formal job offer, and processing new hires, often through the human resources department (Balter and Duncombe, 2008; Engel et al., 2014; Levin and Quinn, 2003; Liu et al., 2008) . In some cases, the first contact that a prospective teacher may have is with staff from a district's office of human resources as opposed to a school administrator (Balter and Duncombe, 2008; Levin and Quinn, 2003) . In addition, district rules and regulations regarding teacher transfers, vacancy notifications, seniority, budgets, and changes in student enrollment can both displace teachers and limit principal autonomy in deciding which teachers to hire to fill vacancies (Levin et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2008) . Such constraints may further exacerbate the inequitable distribution of teachers across schools and districts, with particularly negative implications for large urban districts (Engel and Cannata, 2015; Levin et al., 2005) . Finally, teachers are official employees of their local district or school board. Thus, while evidence indicates that, at least in some contexts, principals can and do offer prospective teachers jobs (e.g. Engel, 2013) , official hiring is often handled centrally.
Recent studies suggest that the teacher hiring process is relatively decentralized in some contexts. In Chicago, for example, principals reported that first interactions often occurred at their schools or at district-run job fairs, and principals reported being the primary decision-makers with regard to teacher hiring (Engel and Finch, 2015) . Similarly, principals in a mid-sized Florida district were found to be the primary decision-makers in the teacher hiring process . Cannata and Engel (2012) found that the majority of principals in both charter and traditional public schools in seven states reported having moderate to major influence in the teacher hiring process.
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Thus, recent studies suggest both that the degree of influence that principals have in the teacher hiring process varies substantially and that many principals do appear to have substantial autonomy in teacher hiring. Below, three factors that likely contribute to the centralization and degree of autonomy principals report in the teacher hiring process are considered: urbanicity, charter status, and whether principals operate in a context with collective bargaining.
Large urban districts, bureaucracy, and teacher hiring The bureaucratic nature of large urban school districts (Chubb and Moe, 1990) implies that hiring decisions in these contexts may be made outside of the particular schools where individual teachers will work. Teacher hiring procedures established by an urban district's central office often aim to increase efficiency in processing the high volume of applications that large districts can receive. For example, Engel et al. (2014) document that in 2006 the Chicago Public Schools had over 19,000 applicants in its database.
Bureaucratization and centralized processes may be more common in urban districts serving more diverse and less socioeconomically advantaged constituencies that also face intense pressure to improve (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Ingersoll, 2003) . Case studies of centralized teacher hiring have focused on large urban districts, identifying potential barriers to effective hiring that may be more pronounced in these contexts (Levin et al., 2005; Levin and Quinn, 2003) . It is also important to consider the fact that principals of schools serving the largest concentrations of students from households with low income and students with lower achievement levels may face more barriers in teacher hiring including fewer applicants (Engel et al., 2014) . Given the attention paid by advocates and researchers to the implications of bureaucratic processes in large urban districts for teacher hiring, as well as the fact that principals in contexts serving large concentrations of traditionally underserved students may face a limited supply of teachers from which to choose, the extent to which principal influence varies systematically by urbanicity is explored in the analyses that follow.
The charter movement, autonomy, and teacher hiring Charter schools were established, in part, to address perceived constraints resulting from highly bureaucratized public school systems (Berends and Zottola, 2009; Chubb and Moe, 1990) . Increased autonomy for principals, particularly around personnel decisions, is argued to be a key feature of charter schools (Gawlik, 2007; Wohlstetter and Chau, 2004) . Charter schools often have fewer constraints with regard to school-level hiring decisions than district-run schools (Gill et al., 2001; Podgursky, 2008) .
Despite increased autonomy for charter schools, comparisons of hiring practices in charter and traditional public schools find more similarities than differences (Cannata and Engel, 2012) , echoing findings that charter schools are often less innovative than theory and rhetoric would predict (Preston et al., 2012) . At the same time, evidence on personnel policies in charter management organizations (CMOs) indicates that they may structure teacher hiring processes with a greater emphasis on fit (DeArmond et al., 2012) . Indeed, one study found that charter school principals in California reported having greater control over teacher hiring and firing than their colleagues in traditional public schools (Guarino, 2003) .
CBAs, perceived and actual constraints on teacher hiring CBAs, negotiated by teachers' unions with school districts, can restrict how school and district administrators make teacher staffing decisions. Indeed, CBAs can reduce flexibility in teacher staffing, particularly with regard to teacher transfers and filling vacancies (Strunk and Grissom, 2010) . For example, a Florida study found that nearly three quarters of sample CBAs required that transfer candidates be considered prior to external candidates 279 Principal influence in teacher hiring (Cohen-Vogel and Osborne-Lampkin, 2007) . Districts with stronger and more politically active teacher's unions have more restrictive CBAs with regard to teacher staffing. Larger districts also tend to have more restrictive contracts (Strunk and Grissom, 2010) .
Evidence suggests that district officials may enact practices in CBA-negotiated domains that reduce flexibility beyond the terms of the negotiated contract (Hess and Kelly, 2006) . For example, in a Florida district with a CBA that did not specify criteria for teacher transfers, 74 percent of teachers were still awarded transfers based on seniority (Cohen-Vogel and Osborne-Lampkin, 2007) .
A case study of five urban districts in varied locations found that union contracts constrained principal discretion in teacher hiring. Levin et al. (2005) reported that large numbers of teaching vacancies were filled by within-district teacher transfers with receiving principals reporting little or no discretion in choosing candidates. The transfer processes that limited principal autonomy in teacher hiring in these districts were linked to CBA provisions around transfers for teachers who were removed from their positions due to declining enrollments or other reorganizations, requirements to consider voluntary transfers before outside candidates, and "hiring windows" preferencing internal candidates.
Data
This study draws on data from the nationally representative SASS, a repeated cross-sectional survey that has been fielded by the National Center for Educational Statistics seven times. These data allow for the examination of national trends in schools and districts over the past two and a half decades. The SASS includes survey data collected from districts, principals, and teachers. The current study includes public school principal data from all seven iterations of the SASS: 1987 SASS: -1988 SASS: , 1990 SASS: -1991 SASS: , 1993 SASS: -1994 SASS: , 1999 SASS: -2000 SASS: , 2003 SASS: -2004 SASS: , 2007 SASS: -2008 SASS: , and 2011 SASS: -2012 . After case-wise deletion for missing covariates, the pooled analytic sample consisted of 47,860 principal year or school year observations. The data set contains repeat cross-sectional data; the SASS does not follow the same set of schools or principals over time.
The SASS asked school principals to rate the degree of influence they had over teacher hiring. Typically, this question was worded as follows: "How much ACTUAL influence do you think each group or person has on decisions concerning the following activities -Hiring new full-time teachers at this school." The exact wording of each question by year is included in the supplementary Appendix. Principal ratings of their influence over teacher hiring is the study's dependent variable. While this question has been included consistently across the seven SASS waves, the number of response categories was reduced from six categories to four over time. For the analyses that follow, principal ratings were recoded to be consistent across years to a four-category scale ranging from no influence (0) to major influence (3). See the Appendix for details on items and recoding. Table I shows descriptive statistics for the analysis sample for each year of the SASS, with each observation representing a single school or principal. The percentage of minority students and students approved for free-and reduced-price lunch (FRPL) served by schools and districts increased between 1987 and 2011. At the school level, the percentage of students eligible for FRPL rose from just under one-third in 1987 to over half in 2011. Average principal experience, reported in years, declined over time from approximately ten years to seven. Several variables, including whether a district has a CBA and school charter status, were available beginning in 1999. A more detailed description of each construct's operationalization, including wording and response options from the SASS, is included in Table AI .
In addition to documenting the overall trend in principal influence over teacher hiring, we explore whether there is systematic variation for schools in urban settings, in districts with CBAs, or for charter schools. The urban variable is drawn from a three-category measure of urbanicity in which schools were considered urban if they were categorized as being in a 280 JEA 56,3
"large or mid-size central city." "Urban fringe of large or mid-size city" was collapsed with "small-town/rural" to create a dichotomous indicator of whether a school was urban or not. As shown, approximately one in four schools was in an urban context. Collective bargaining indicates whether a school district reported having a CBA with a teachers' union. The comparison group includes districts that have a union agreement with only a meet and confer arrangement and districts with no teachers' union. As shown in Table I , the proportion of schools in districts with CBAs declined by about 10 percentage points between 1999 and 2011. The third independent variable of interest, charter school status, is a binary indicator. As shown, the proportion of charter schools increased from 1 to 5 percent between 1999 and 2011. Both the CBA and charter school indicators were not included on earlier SASS surveys. Thus, analyses with these variables use data from the four waves spanning 1999 to 2011.
In addition to these key independent variables, models include a rich set of controls. Table I shows all of the variables included in the analyses. School-and district-level characteristics were controlled for, including school level (primary, secondary, or combined), principal experience (as well as an indicator of whether principals were in their first year), characteristics of students served (such as the percentage eligible for FRPL and the percentage who are non-white), size (school and district enrollment and number of schools in the district), and geographic region.
Methods for modeling the association between principal influence on teacher hiring and school characteristics First, descriptive statistics documenting changes across SASS waves in principal reported influence on teacher hiring over time are shown for the full sample and for subgroups of interest. Then the associations between these key variables and principal ratings of their influence on teacher hiring, controlling for relevant covariates, are explored. Ordered logistic regression models are estimated, using the pooled data set that includes all seven of the SASS waves. The models are specified as follows: ( 1) where Influence dsy represents a principal's rating of his or her influence on teacher hiring for school s in district d in year y, Urban dsy represents a dummy variable for whether the school is in an urban setting, CBA dy represents a dummy variable for whether the school is in a district with a CBA, CharterStatus dsy is a dummy variable indicating charter status, School dsy , Principal dsy , and District dy represent the vectors of control variables at each level, Year y represents a set of year dummy variables, and e dsy is a random error term. The coefficients of interest are β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 which provide estimates of the association between whether a school is urban, whether the district has collective bargaining, whether the school is a charter school, and principal rated influence over teacher hiring. Ordered logistic regression, or the proportional odds model, is an extension of logistic regression to outcomes that contain more than two response categories (McCullagh, 1980) . The ordered logistic regression model is appropriate for outcomes such as those examined in this study in which the differences across response categories are not uniform (Fullerton, 2009 ). Coefficients estimated from ordered logistic models are interpreted as the predicted change in the outcome level in the ordered log-odds scale for a one-unit change in the independent variable of interest. For ease of interpretation, corresponding odds ratios are provided, which are interpreted as the proportional odds of a principal choosing a higher category of influence over hiring as compared to categories indicating less influence.
The second set of models explores the changes over time in the relationship between the independent variables of interest and the outcome by interacting year with each independent variable of interest. Separate models are estimated in the form of Equation (2) in which a single measure of year is interacted with whether a school's location is urban, having a CBA, or charter status:
I nfluences dsy ¼ b 0 þb 1 U rban dsy þb 2 CBA dy þb 3 CharterStatus dsy þb 4 School dsy þb 5 Principal dsy þb 6 District dy þb 7 Y ear y þb 8 Y ear Â U rban dsy þe dsy (2) This model mirrors Equation (1), replacing the year dummy variables with the year variable, Year, and a term representing the interaction between each of the independent variables of interest, respectively, and the year variable. Specifically, separate models in which Year is interacted with Urban dsy, CBA dy , and CharterStatus dsy are estimated.
A third set of models with separate regressions for each year in which the SASS was administered was also estimated. Results for these models are shown in appendix Tables AII and AIII. Two of the independent variables of interest, charter status, and CBA, are available only in the four most recent waves of the SASS, beginning in 1999. This is also the case for two covariates; district percentage of students eligible for FRPL and number of schools in the district. Thus, results from models with and without these variables of interest and covariates are shown. Models including all variables of interest and covariates are limited to SASS waves from 1999 to 2011. Additionally, despite being included on the 1999 SASS principal survey, there were very few charter schools that year. Descriptive results for charter schools in 1999 are presented, but charter schools are dropped for models run for 1999 because of case-wise deletion due to other missing covariates. Models in which urban 282 JEA 56,3 and rural schools were compared as separate categories to suburban schools were also tested and results were similar to the preferred models. In all models, standard errors are clustered by district year (or by district in models run separately by year) to account for non-independence. Estimates are weighted using administrator weights.
Principals have gained influence in teacher hiring over time Descriptive trends documenting increased principal influence Principal reports indicate that their perceived influence over teacher hiring increased substantially over the past two and a half decades. Table II shows this upward trend. The percentage of principals who reported having a major influence over teacher hiring increased from 47 percent in 1987 to 85 percent in 2011, peaking at 90 percent in 2007. Very few principals ever reported having no influence over teacher hiring. The modal category is always "major influence," with the second most likely responses falling into category 2. Thus, the majority of principals have reported substantial influence over teacher hiring across the SASS waves, with most change resulting from principals reporting increased influence, as opposed to shifting from no influence to some influence.
Increased perception of influence over teacher hiring was particularly pronounced among principals in urban schools. As shown in Table III In contrast to the large increase in reported influence among principals in urban settings, principal reported influence over teacher hiring did not vary substantially by whether districts were bound by a CBA either within year or over time. As shown in Table III , both the baseline measure and changes in influence over hiring were fairly similar for districts Modeling factors associated with trends and levels of principal influence Results are shown from ordered logistic regression models predicting principal reported influence using independent variables of interest including whether a school is urban, whether the district had a CBA, and charter status. These models include controls for potentially confounding variables at the district, school, and principal levels. Data are pooled across all years for which variables of interest are available. Coefficients for year indicators test whether trends over time suggested in descriptive statistics (and disaggregated models, see appendix tables Tables AII and AIII) are statistically significant. Table IV , Column 1 shows results including all waves of the SASS. Column 3 shows results for 1999 through 2011 only, where collective bargaining, charter status, and control variables available only in the four most recent waves of the SASS are included.
As shown in Columns 1 and 2, coefficients and odds ratios for year indicators show a trend indicating increased principal influence over time. The table shows statistically significant negative coefficients in 1987, 1990, and 1993, and statistically significant positive values in 2003, 2007, and 2011, all compared with 1999 (the omitted year). Odds ratios range in value from 0.29 in 1987 to a high of 3.65 in 2007. Thus, principals surveyed in 2007 had over 3 and a half times higher odds of reporting more influence (being in a higher influence category) than their counterparts in 1999. Results also indicate that principals in urban schools report less influence over teacher hiring, controlling for year and other covariates.
Columns 3 and 4 show results using data from the four most recent waves of the SASS (beginning in 1999) to estimate results for charter schools and districts with CBAs. These models also control for district-level minority enrollment and number of schools in the district. Results indicate that principals in urban contexts still report substantially less influence over teacher hiring. Controlling for year and other covariates, charter school principals report having substantially more influence over teacher hiring than non-charter principals, with an odds ratio of 2.99, while principals in districts with CBAs report less influence over teacher hiring. Table V shows the results for models where the main independent variables of interest -whether a school is urban, whether a district has a CBA, or charter status were interacted with a single measure of year. For the urban indicator, estimates are provided both for data pooled across all seven SASS waves (Column 1) as well as for models including the larger set of control variables available beginning in 1999 (Column 3). As shown, in models pooled across all years in Table V , Column 1, the interaction between year and urban is significant and positive, indicating, as suggested by descriptive results, that principal reports of influence over teacher hiring increased significantly over time in urban districts, compared to their non-urban counterparts. The interaction is not significant when data are restricted to the four most recent SASS waves. These results reflect the descriptive results illustrated in Figure 1 , indicating that the largest increase in perceived influence over teacher hiring among principals in urban schools occurred between 1987 and 1999.
In addition to the dichotomous variable indicating "urban" vs "non-urban," we ran descriptive statistics and estimated models where we compared "urban" with "suburban" Unit of observation is a school year. Standard errors clustered by district-year. Omitted categories are non-urban, Midwest, elementary, non-charter, no collective bargaining, and year 1999. Administrator weights utilized. Columns 3 and 4 utilize the maximum set of controls resulting in case-wise deletion of all observations from 1987 to 1999 due to variables not being included on surveys in those years. Columns 1 and 2 utilize a consistent set of controls retaining observations from all years. *p o0.05; **po 0.01 Table IV . Coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratios from ordered logistic regressions predicting principal rating of influence over teacher hiring using data pooled across years 285 Principal influence in teacher hiring and "rural." Patterns for suburban and rural schools were nearly identical. In addition, there were changes in how SASS classified schools as "suburban" or "rural" over the years studied. For these reasons, we collapsed these categories into one variable.
The second panel of Table V shows results for the interaction between year and CBA, indicating no statistically significant variation over time in the effect of a district having a CBA on principals' perceptions of influence in teacher hiring. As shown in the third panel of Table V , there is a statistically significant negative trend in charter school principals' reported influence over teacher hiring relative to principals in non-charter public schools over time. As shown in Table IV , charter principals report somewhat greater influence over teacher hiring, on average, than their counterparts in traditional public schools, conditional on all covariates including year. The negative coefficient on the interaction with year indicates that this greater influence diminished over time.
Implications of increased principal influence in teacher hiring
Principals' reported influence over teacher hiring has increased over time. Although policy advocates have argued for a shift toward principals having more input into teacher hiring (e.g. Levin et al., 2005) , this paper is the first to document this trend. Since 1987, teacher hiring decisions have become more decentralized, with authority shifting from districts to schools. While this study is focused on the USA, results are consistent with research documenting increasing site-based management and principal autonomy over hiring in other countries (Vegas, 2007; Whitaker, 2003) .
The trend in principals reporting more influence in teacher hiring is particularly pronounced among principals of urban schools. 25 years ago, urban principals were considerably less likely to report having substantial influence on teacher hiring. By 2011, the difference between urban Results shown are from three separate regression models; one estimating the interaction between urban and year, the second between collective bargaining and year, and the third estimating the interaction between charter school and year. Unit of observation is a school year. Standard errors clustered by district year. Omitted category for urban is non-urban, for charter is non-charter and for collective bargaining agreement is districts that did not have one. Regressions are weighted using administrator weights. Columns 1 and 2 show results from models including the consistent set of controls from Table IV while Columns 3 and 4 utilize the maximum set of controls shown Table IV . Unusually large coefficients and odds ratios result from the inclusion of the continuous year variable. For example, the coefficient on charter school, urban, and collective bargaining reflect year 0, which lacks substantive meaning. *p o0.05; **po 0.01 If principal autonomy and influence in making decisions related to human capital within their schools is desirable, then the increase in principal influence over teacher hiring is a promising trend. Along with calls from advocates, researchers have found that principals emphasize the importance of "fit" when they have autonomy in teacher hiring and have argued that this may lead to more optimal hires. Principals are more likely now than ever before to have access to data and information about teachers (e.g. past value-added estimates) that might help them select the best teachers for their schools. Further, recent evidence indicates that screening information now collected by some school districts is a valid predictor of teacher effectiveness (Goldhaber et al., 2017) . Thus, if principals are the best candidates for assessing the fit of teacher applicants Levin et al., 2005) , access to more and better data on applicants has the potential to further improve principal decision-making.
While the potential for principals to be able to make optimal hiring decisions for their schools may hold promise, it also must be considered in light of the large body of research documenting the inequitable distribution of teachers across schools (e.g. Goldhaber et al., 2015) . Notably, this research illuminates important characteristics of teacher labor markets with regard to geography and teacher preferences. Evidence suggests that teachers have strong geographic preferences, tending to teaching close to where they are from (Boyd et al., 2005; Reininger, 2012) and that within urban districts teachers apply systematically to schools serving more advantaged and higher achieving students (Engel et al., 2014) . Engel and Cannata (2015) argue that these preferences may have negative equity implications for urban schools and districts with decentralized teacher hiring.
Authorizing principals as the primary decision-makers in teacher hiring assumes that they have access to an adequate supply of teachers from which to choose. That teacher preferences may result in inequitable distributions of teacher supply across schools within districts, however, suggests that decentralization may have negative implications for equity in the distribution of teachers. Further, even if an ample supply of teachers exists, evidence suggests that principals' preferences and hiring practices can vary systematically in ways that have the potential to exacerbate inequalities across schools (Baker and Cooper, 2005; Engel, 2013; Engel and Curran, 2016; Engel and Finch, 2015) . This is partly due to variation in how principals make use of newly available data on teacher effectiveness (Cannata et al., 2017) .
Principals in districts with CBAs report less influence, on average, on teacher hiring. This is consistent with prior case studies and research suggesting that CBAs can limit principal autonomy (Levin et al., 2005; Strunk and Grissom, 2010) and that principals and districts with CBAs may impose restrictions that go beyond the terms of the agreements themselves (e.g. Cohen-Vogel and Osborne-Lampkin, 2007) . At the same time, it is important to note that there is wide variation in the nature and terms of CBAs. Thus, a potentially fruitful avenue for future research could explore variation in the extent to which current CBAs constrain principal autonomy in teacher hiring.
The finding that charter school principals reported more influence over teacher hiring than their public school counterparts, even after controlling for characteristics such as collective bargaining, district size, and urbanicity, complements recent work suggesting that CMOs take an active role in managing their teacher talent to emphasize applicant fit in recruiting and hiring (DeArmond et al., 2012) . Results presented for charter schools are limited to the four most recent waves of the SASS. The time period for which data on charter schools is available coincides with both a dramatic increase in the number of charter schools and CMOs.
The finding that charter school principals report more influence over teacher hiring than their public school counterparts takes on particular policy relevance given the federal 287 Principal influence in teacher hiring government's recent rhetoric indicating strong support for school choice. It is important to note that there is wide variation in the effectiveness of school choice options in general, and, in the effectiveness of charter schools in particular. Charter school performance varies by state policy context, local educational environment, and school operational arrangements (Cremata et al., 2013; Gleason et al., 2010) . Of particular relevance for this focus on influence in teacher hiring is the evidence that charter schools that are operated by non-profit organizations, known as CMOs, have higher student achievement gains, on average, than independent charter schools or those operated by for-profit organizations (Woodworth et al., 2017) . That CMOs often focus on teacher effectiveness, such as hiring teachers who fit with their mission and providing coaching, may help to explain their more positive average outcomes (DeArmond et al., 2012; Furgeson et al., 2012) . Given this context, future research should explore differences in principal influence over teacher hiring across school types within the charter sector, such as in independent charter schools vs charter schools that are part of larger networks such as CMOs or between non-profit and for-profit charter operators. The implications of such differences are particularly relevant for issues of equity given that charter schools are more likely to serve student populations that are from traditionally underserved populations.
The finding indicating that the larger influence over teacher hiring reported by charter school principals declines over time points to another area for future research. One possible explanation is that the growth in CMOs and charter networks has been accompanied by a rise in centralized hiring practices that constrain the autonomy of charter school principals (National Charter School Research Project, 2007) . Another explanation may be that districts have learned from hiring practices of CMOs to provide more hiring autonomy to their principals. Unpacking and exploring each of these hypotheses can have important policy implications as they pertain to whether charter schools are meeting stated policy goals of school-level autonomy or serving as models of innovation for traditional public schools and districts.
The current study is not without limitations. While a strength of the SASS is that results are nationally representative and provide what may be the first evidence of a systematic increase in the decentralization of teacher hiring, using large-scale survey data also imposes constraints. The fact that the number of response categories changed across waves means that results are not perfectly comparable over time. Furthermore, principal reports reflecting their perceptions of their influence over teacher hiring, may differ from their actual influence in ways that are not observed. Future research should explore the decentralization of teacher hiring from a historical perspective to provide an understanding of why teacher hiring has become more decentralized, particularly in urban districts.
It is important to keep in mind that the results presented in this study are correlational. While the SASS provides rich data about principals, schools, and districts, the survey, on its own, was not designed with the purpose of answering causal questions. Thus, while we document trends in principal influence over teacher hiring and associations between school and district characteristics and principal influence, we do not claim that these relationships are causal. We also note that principal influence over teacher hiring will be constrained in contexts where principals do not have access to a large or well-qualified applicant pool. The SASS does not provide data that allows us to examine the relative size or qualifications of teacher applicant pools, or labor supply, available to schools or districts.
Ultimately, hiring outcomes and human capital decisions are most relevant in terms of how they affect the students that principals and districts serve (DeArmond et al., 2010) . Increasing principal influence over teacher hiring assumes that principals have the ability to make the "best" hiring choices for their schools. Yet, past research suggests that principals may not always hire the best teachers (e.g. Ballou, 1996) and that the quality of the hiring processes principals establish in their schools varies (Cannata et al., 2017; DeArmond et al., 2010) .
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Future research should examine the implications of high levels of principal autonomy or input into teacher hiring with regard to equity across different types of schools as well as in terms of the extent to which principals hire teachers who are effective in raising student achievement. Finally, future research should expand upon the results of the current study by exploring the influence of other actors, such as teachers, in the hiring process and whether that influence has changed over time.
Note
1. Charter schools were included in the 1999 SASS. However, there were so few in the sample that the charter variable is dropped from that year due to missing data on other covariates.
1993-1994:
Using the scale 0-5, where 0 is "None" and 5 is "A great deal," indicate how much ACTUAL influence you think each group or person has on decisions concerning the following activities -hiring new full-time teachers. Responses 0 (none) to 5 (a great deal).
1999-2000:
Using the scale 1-5, where 1 is "No influence" and 5 is "A great deal of influence," how much ACTUAL influence do you think each group or person has on decisions concerning the following activities?
Hiring new full-time teachers at this school.
Responses: 1 (none) to 5 (a great deal of influence).
2003-2004:
How much ACTUAL influence do you think each group or person has on decisions concerning the following activities? Hiring new full-time teachers at this school.
Responses: 1 (no influence) to 4 (major influence).
2007-2008:
How much ACTUAL influence do you think each group or person has on decisions concerning the following activities? -hiring new full-time teachers of this school.
2011-2012:
How much ACTUAL influence do you think you have as a principal on decisions concerning the following activities? Hiring new full-time teachers of this school.
Details on item recoding
For the first three iterations -1987, 1990 , and 1993 -principals rated their influence on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 6, with 1 representing "none" and 6 representing "a great deal" of influence. The scale was reduced to five categories for the 1999 principal survey and labels for the top and bottom categories changed to "no influence" and "major influence," respectively, and to four categories for , and 2011 . For years with a six-item scale (i.e. 1987 -1988 through 1993 -1994 , categories 2 and 3 were converted to 1, categories 4 and 5 to category 2, the top and bottom categories remain unchanged -representing "none" and "a great deal" intact. For the year with a five-item scale (i.e. 1999-2000) , categories 2 and 3 were converted to category 1, category 4 to category 2, with the top and bottom categories left intact. This recoding resulted in a consistent scale from 0 to 3, with 0 always representing the lowest rating of principal influence and 3 always representing the highest rating of principal influence. A description of how each variable is operationalized is found in Table AI .
Regression models by year Methods In addition to the models using pooled data shown in the main text, we ran separate models predicting principal reported influence on teacher hiring for each of the SASS years separately. These models took the following form: control variables at each level, and e ds is a random error term. The coefficients of interest are β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 , which provide estimates of the association between whether a school is urban, whether the district has collective bargaining, whether the school is a charter school, and principal rated influence over teacher hiring. Table AII , the coefficient on urbanicity is statistically significant and negative in 1987. However, by 2011, the coefficient is near zero and statistically insignificant. The relationship between the presence of a CBA and principal rated influence over hiring is shown in Table AIII. Given that CBAs were only asked about on SASS surveys beginning in 1999, the results from these models are for this limited set of years. These models also include controls for charter status and district-level measures of the percentage of students eligible for FRPL and the number of schools in the districts that, similarly, are only available from 1999 onward. As shown, the relationship between CBA and principal rated influence over hiring is statistically significant and negative in all years except 1999. This indicates that having a CBA is associated with principals' perceiving less influence over teacher hiring. The pattern also suggests that this association has not changed much between 1999 and 2011. Notably, the coefficients on urban and district enrollment are similar in these models as in those not controlling for charter status or collective bargaining (Table AII) .
Results
As shown in
We find that principals of charter schools report more influence over teacher hiring in all years for which data are available [1] . The coefficient is statistically significant in all years, and although its magnitude declined across the three waves for which data are available (the odds ratio went from 5.22 to 2.31), the higher levels of influence perceived by charter principals remain sizeable.
Construct
Item 
